AL Predictions

from MLBlogs

Predictions don't really mean anything. You really can't predict injuries, breakouts, breakdowns, etc., but I like making them anyway. It's a fun exercise. What do you think is going to happen? What actually happens? We always have excellent reasons for why we think something is going to happen, but we're usually dead wrong. This is just an exercise. Feel free to disagree with me, but please realize that you're just as likely to be wrong as I am.

AL East
New York Yankees --> It pains me to say this, but they are probably the best team in baseball. The offense is stellar, and why anyone would complain about Swisher (.357 career OBP) and Gardner (.346 OBP last season) hitting in the 8-9 slots is beyond me. The rotation has been a bit overrated (Sabathia is a stud, but the rest are better bets for ERAs around 4), but it's way more than enough to win for that offense. The bullpen should be fine unless Rivera decides he's 40, but I wouldn't expect that. Defensively, the outfield should be fairly close to amazing, but I wonder if the infield isn't due for a serious letdown. Regardless, this team will likely win 97 games. Final Prediction: Once the Yankees make the playoffs, debate will rage as to whether A-Rod can repeat last year's "clutchness".

Tampa Bay Rays (WC) --> They have the best defense in the East, and the offense may really break out if BJ Upton returns to form. Pitching-wise, there's plenty of depth and plenty of potential upside, but they've failed to realize that potential so far. Here's to Garza, Price, and Davis figuring things out. As for the bullpen, Soriano should be excellent, but the bullpen, including Soriano, has injury issues. Luckily, the Rays have plenty of depth to make up for whatever injuries they encounter. This team could be the major's most talented, but you can only dream on upside and youth so much. Final Prediction: Team chemistry is destroyed when the clubhouse splits on who has the most ridiculous chin hair, Garza or Soriano.

Boston Red Sox --> The defense will be excellent, and the offense will be better than most expect. But I think the Rays are better in those two aspects. Consistency and dependability in the rotation is where the Red Sox have an edge, but I have a feeling that Garza and Price are going to really grow and become monsters this season (I get to be subjective; these are my predictions). Otherwise, the Red Sox will win 91 and fall short of the playoffs by a few games. Life's just not fair. Final Prediction: Disregarding the fact that the team won 91 games and that Mike Cameron is still worth more, Red Sox writers will condemn Theo for not re-signing Bay when Bay's first season in New York goes extremely well.

Baltimore Orioles --> Adam Jones, Nolan Reimold, and (of course) Matt Wieters step up to compensate for Markakis' inability to get close to his 2008 season. The rotation won't look pretty, but it's hard to be worse than they were last season. Brian Matusz becomes the best pitcher in the rotation by June, but it's more because Millwood and Guthrie are "innings eaters" and because Brad Bergesen just isn't that good. Final Prediction: The divisions re-align themselves in the middle of the season because Matt Wieters says so, but the Orioles still finish out of the money. Deities can only do so much.

Toronto Blue Jays --> The pitching will be pretty good, but I just don't see how good the defense and offense are going to be. The outfield will probably rank among the worst in the majors defensively, and the infield will hardly begin to make up for it. Offensively, Lind, Snider, and Hill do decent jobs, but there's just nothing else to get remotely excited about. But the pitching will be good. Final Prediction: Alex Anthopolous regrets signing so many scouts, not because they are useless, because he'd like an excuse to watch Kyle Drabek instead of the crap he'll throw out in Toronto.

AL Central
Minnesota Twins --> You just don't bet against Gardenhire. The team should improve with the additions of Hudson, Hardy, and a better season from Liriano. Nathan's injury hurts, but even as good as he is (he's one of the few relievers that you pay actual money for), I don't think it will hurt as much as people think. The bullpen will pitch well enough, and the offense will be much better with a full season of Mauer and having Hudson and Hardy. Final Prediction: There's a snow-out in Baltimore, but people will still bitch about an open-air stadium in Minnesota, in which there are no weather problems in April.

Detroit Tigers --> The front of the rotation looks really good, and it's easy to get excited about their young arms. Offensively, they'll be decent enough, but Damon will be a massive disappointment while Magglio's increased production forces an interesting debate as to whether to give him the at-bats to vest that option. The bullpen makes for an interesting watch. Lots of them can throw ridiculously hard, but none are particularly adept at throwing pitches for strikes or for keeping their arms intact. Final Prediction: The Tigers give enough ABs to Ordonez for his massive option to vest. He'll hit enough to justify giving him so many ABs (though not $18 MM worth), but the Tigers will narrowly miss the playoffs again. Life just isn't fair.

Cleveland Indians --> The offense really comes alive, and it makes up (somewhat) for the lack of pitching depth. Sizemore, Choo, Cabrera, LaPorta, Branyan, and the June arrival of Carlos Santana bash enough for some people to reminisce about the mid to late 1990s Indian offenses. The defense, somewhat under the radar, increases their productivity. Unfortunately, Fausto Carmona, who bounces back, isn't enough to make up for the utter lack of decent options for the rest of the rotation. Final Prediction: Grady Sizemore wins Comeback Player of the Year and will get overlooked in the MVP race because his team won't win enough.

Chicago White Sox --> There's no disputing the rotation. It's the best in the division, and it will make an argument for best in the majors. Unfortunately, they pull a reverse-Cleveland and can't score nearly enough. Konerko declines, Rios continues to disappoint, and the Jones-Kotsay DH platoon works out predictably poorly. I love Ozzie Guillen, but just no. Final Prediction: Ozzie gets pissed enough about the lack of offense that he puts on a uniform to improve run production. Someone then points out that he was never very good even during his peak. That someone is then killed.

Kansas City Royals --> Zach Greinke does extremely well and will garner support for another Cy Young Award. Billy Butler hits a few more home runs but remains in relative obscurity. Joakim Soria wonders how his career would be different if he was a starter as he sits in the bullpen for weeks on end without being used. The rest of the team predictably sucks. Final Prediction: Dayton Moore finally loses his job as GM. Not because the team sucks but because he's arrested for giving the owner tainted water from one of the fountains in the outfield in Kauffman Stadium. Everything is finally explained and reason reigns again. Kansas City remains stuck with Yuniesky Betancourt. Life just isn't fair.

AL West
Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim --> For all the hoopla about the Mariners' offseason, the Angels remain the team to beat. The rotation will be one of the best in baseball as Santana and Kazmir rebound to be quite effective. Offensively, the team remains strong as Morales is for real, Kendrick finally stays healthy and productive, and Wood has a pretty good season in his first full season. In a weird turn of events, the bullpen goes back to being the major's most productive after a poor 2009. Final Prediction: Thousands of people get lost on the way to the All-Star Game when they are unsure if they should go to Los Angeles or Anaheim.

Texas Rangers --> The rotation does fairly well, but Harden is either ineffective, unhealthy, or both. Some of the prospects really step up to put together a run at the division until it falls a little short. The offense continues to hit, and Max Ramirez becomes the starting catcher by mid-season. The defense isn't too shabby, either. They become the only other AL West team over .500. Final Prediction: Jerry Jones buys the Rangers and builds a new stadium with the first scoreboard that overhangs the field. The scoreboard is also bigger than the field and with better definition.

Seattle Mariners --> The defense is certainly impressive, but I have to wrench my neck to find something else to be excited about. King Felix is certainly awesome and Cliff Lee should be fine once he gets back in late April, but the rest of the rotation is terrible. If David Aardsma realizes that he's a flame-thrower without any control, the bullpen isn't great. The offense gets on-base at an above-average clip to score a few more runs than predicted, but too many at-bats wasted on Griffey/Sweeney kill any actual productivity. They're a better team, but it won't come with better results. Final Prediction: The Mariners trade for Russell Branyan when they get tired of watching Kotchman slap the ball all over the infield.

Oakland Athletics --> Ben Sheets hasn't been consistently healthy since 2002-2004, and he won't be this season. The rest of the rotation is decent, but the only above-average starter is Brett Anderson. The offense remains putrid, but the defense is pretty solid. There are worse teams than Oakland, but I can't imagine that they win more than 75 games. Final Prediction: Kurt Suzuki is traded to the Boston Red Sox mid-season. Just sayin'.


MVP --> Evan Longoria leads the Rays into the postseason and finally becomes the star he should be.

Cy Young --> Josh Beckett says no to the Red Sox extension offer, has a monstrous season, and still ends up back in Boston next year.

Rookie of the Year --> Justin Smoak explodes when the Rangers finally realize that they're better off platooning Chris Davis and Vladimir Guerrero at DH with Smoak's glove and stick at first.

Not Feeling a Draft

 from MLB

I'm going to steal an idea from Keith Law for a moment. I don't know when he first came up with the idea or when he first publicly stated the idea, but the first time I saw it was last summer during the Stephen Strasburg debates (I found it funny that there were vehement arguments stating he should have gotten more money and others barking that he made too much considering he had never thrown a major-league pitch; both seem fairly legitimate to me, but I side with the former). 

Initially, I thought it was a terrible idea, but it has grown on me the more I’ve thought about it. We've been taught that the draft was the solution to the Yankee domination from the 1920s to the 1960s (they won 20 World Series during that time; only one other team has even won 10 in all of baseball history!). The Yankees had essentially been buying up some talented prospects and using the Kansas City A's as a farm team, and with everyone tired of it, they instituted the draft (okay, that's not exactly why it happened, but it's what we've been led to believe; perception is reality). Instituting the draft in 1965 was supposed to redistribute talent throughout baseball, making the game fairer. And you know what, it did (or at least appeared to). It was the right solution. The Yankees have only won 7 World Series since, and the Cardinals have only won 3 (the Cardinals are the team with 10 World Series Championships). 

But just because it worked then, does it mean it continues to work now? It's odd how we perceive things. In this instance, the draft initially worked to create (better) competitive balance, and now as we search for more competitive balance, we can't let go of the draft. Free-agency for amateurs is what caused the problem necessitating the draft, so how can it be the answer now? How can the draft have been a solution and now be part of the problem? The answer is that times change.

Today isn't the same as yesterday. The reasons that the draft was a good idea in the 1960s no longer exist (some variations exist -- people believing other teams to be farm systems of the Yankees -- but the situations are so drastically different that it's not worth mentioning, really – better scouting, scouting more players, institution of free-agency, Latin America). In fact, it might actually make quite a bit of sense to go back to a time without a draft. When one looks at politics, for example, one often sees a pendulum of sorts -- after a period of Democrat rule, Republicans take over -- because one side usually goes a bit too far, and a natural correction, of sorts, takes place. It’s a necessary maneuver to reduce abuses of power and maintain some focus on public interest. It's never a complete swing back (today's liberals are tomorrow's conservatives) as adjustments have been made to learn from mistakes. After a period of time where the draft has been implemented, used, and manipulated, it might be time to get rid of it with the addition of a few tweaks. If that doesn't blow your mind, then this might -- after a few decades, we might have to go back to a draft, and it won’t mean abolishing the draft was a mistake.

Anyway, does a draft-less MLB work? What are the perceptions and questions? What are the problems with the draft-less proposal that need some tinkering?

Won't the Yankees just buy everyone?

I'll make some Yankees fans happy, for once. No, they won't buy everyone. Look at the international market now. Aroldis Chapman, Michael Ynoa, Edward Salcedo, Elvis Andrus, etc. were not signed by the Yankees, Red Sox, Mets, or Angels. What people tend to forget is that prospecting carries a lot of risk, even enough to make big-market teams wince. The large-market teams will scout players and decide whether they believe the player is worth the risk. And as much money as the Yankees have, they're still playing with opportunity risks. If they spend an abundance of money on amateur free-agents, they will eventually have to spend less on their major-league roster. With the payroll they have, it might actually make more sense to spend money on established free-agents than prospects (they have enough money that spending more for established production outweighs spending money for upside in risky prospects). Let's use Strasburg as an example. Some believed that he would have made $50 million if he had been on the free-agent market. While $1-2 million won't make much of a difference to the Yankees, $50 million would have quite an impact, even on them. And then, the Yankees have to consider the risk of signing him. We have high expectations for him, but a blown elbow could be around the corner. Additionally, they then have to weigh signing Strasburg and not signing other players ($50 million could buy a lot of prospects). The Yankees seem to have an unlimited payroll, but they don't. And the big-market teams’ money already helps them accrue better talent when a team in the front of the draft sticks to slot and avoids a big talent, who then falls to the big-market team later, so sticking with what we have isn’t solving that problem.

But don't they still have more money to spend than anyone else?

Yes, but it's not so simple. If the Yankees simply set aside $20 million for amateur free-agents, they could go after the top prospects only and end up with Dustin Ackely, Tyler Matzek, and Shelby Miller instead of worrying about 11th and 12th round picks. Again, there's a lot of risk there (a lot of money tied into fewer prospects), but they might do that for the potential upside. I have a few ideas on what to do, but I’m not sure if any of them are any good. One, place a ceiling on how much a team can spend depending on where they finish (bad teams get to spend more than winning teams), but that might prevent the Yankees (or someone else; I’m not trying to pick on the Yankees) from making a crippling mistake. Two, place a limit on the number of prospects they can sign, but if you do that, they'll just go hog-wild on the top guys. Three, create a points system based on talent level of the prospect and place a cap on how many "points" a team can sign, but there are so many logistical issues with that that it's almost not worth mentioning. Yes, the Yankees can spend more money, but they would also be taking on a disproportionate amount of risk while also dipping into the major-league budget. 

Is it really all about the money, stupid?

This will really get you going. It's not, though money obviously has a significant effect. But let's take a look at the decision-making process. An amateur has two missions -- to make a mountain of money and to make it to the major leagues. Money only solves one of those desires. The road to the majors also has an effect. If I really want to make the team, would I choose a big-market team that constantly overlooks its prospects, often trading them, for established major-league players? And what happens if the Yankees do actually initially load up on prospects? Do you really want to fight through all of those other highly-touted prospects when you could get through another system much faster? I realize that there are such things as "wanting to play for your childhood team", but self-promotion is often a powerful force. I'd rather be a major-league star for the Giants than a 26-year old AAA guy for the Red Sox. It even might make financial sense (give up money now for the chance at more later when you reach free-agency quicker). And sometimes the “childhood team” is the Orioles.

But won't signing bonuses for prospects skyrocket, thus limiting small-market teams’ budgets?

Probably not. It's supply and demand. The really good prospects (like the top 15) will probably see a jump in what they can demand from teams because a lot of teams will want them and their talent separates them into the truly elite, cant-miss guys. The next 50 players or so become more interchangeable, and while they are talented and desired by many teams, they won't separate themselves as much from each other. They'll likely end up garnering as much as they get now and maybe a little more. As for the rest, they might actually see their bonuses tank or, more probably, stay the same. If most of the top 100 can't separate themselves, then once you get past them, there's really little separation in talent. If you have a lot of similar quality guys, players lose leverage. They'll take less just to make a team. As for the small-market teams, they probably won’t have to pay much more than they do now.

But what about the difference between Americans and non-Americans?

This is where something really needs to be done. Right now, it's nowhere near fair that a Latin American can choose where to go and for how much money when an American has no such luck. This isn't a xenophobic remark of "Those foreigners shouldn't be treated better than good ole' American boys." It's that each player should be treated the same. There should be equality. No player should receive advantages over other players simply based on their country of origin. Does the amateur free-agency solve this? Almost but not completely. The ability to choose has been granted. We still have, however, the issue of age (foreigners can sign at 16, but Americans have to be out of high school, usually at 18) and college (Division I players have to wait three years out of high school to re-enter the draft whereas it doesn't matter for foreigners). How do we change this? One, eliminate the college rule. If they want to be one-and-done, let it happen (If you say something about killing the college game, I’ll slap you and refer to the fact that the only college games on TV involve the CWS and no one really watches those anyway; plus, metal bats are stupid at that age). Unfortunately, the age issue is a bit testier, but I think it's easier than one might imagine. I would either make a universal age-16 or age-18 rule. The Age-16 Rule (making everyone eligible at 16 no matter their country of origin) will anger those in favor of education. However, if a player can get serious money at age 16 to go play baseball, they can come back to get their GED, but I can see a worse stigma than someone now has with going back to college. I would, therefore, advocate the Age-18 Rule (the same as Age-16 but now at age 18). It nullifies the advantage of foreigners who can get into the systems two years earlier (a major advantage and reason that the Caribbean is scoured so heavily), but again, we're going for some semblance of fairness. Maybe the MLB can create some leagues in foreign countries that promote better competition for 16-18 year olds. Or maybe we can compromise. Players can sign as early as 16, but they can't officially enter the farm system (rookie leagues or above) until 18. For the age 16-18 seasons, the MLB can create developmental leagues for the summer (much like AAU). I'm open to suggestions, but they have to make it fair for Americans and non-Americans.

But won’t their be abuses here as well?

Sure. There usually are. This is why we need tweaks to the original system, or we need to understand how the other changes in the game since the draft was instituted will eliminate the original abuses of a draft-less MLB. But remember, if there are problems, you can make tweaks after a few years. Just do it for a good reason. It’s hard to predict the effects of a social theory. Soft slotting may have seemed like a good idea in theory, but we’ve seen how that worked.

Not having a draft isn't as ridiculous as some believe. We don't need a draft to aid competitive balance, even though it helped 45 years ago. Times have changed, and the draft actually creates problems now (not being able to trade draft picks, free-agent compensation, soft slotting system, difference between Americans and non-Americans). Free-agency for amateurs will open things up. If teams want to pour money into prospects, they can buy as many as they want. If prospects don’t make as much sense for a team, then it doesn’t have to waste its time. Signing prospects doesn’t make the same sense to everyone. There might be an initial bout with fairness (maybe a rush to be with the Yankees or Red Sox), but it will undergo a self-correction (there are only so many spots on a 25-man roster – 25, in fact). Then, we'll let it go for another 30-40 years, and after technology and scouting change yet again, we might have to go back to a draft. Sometimes creating stability means creating flexibility, and it means realizing that going back to a previous arrangement doesn’t mean that the current one was a mistake originally. Let's not be too hard-headed and cling to what we know just because we know it.

Relief Pitchers and "Appearances"

 from MLBlogs

If you look at last season's leaderboard for most appearances by a reliever, you will see four Braves in the top 10. It's the thing about Bobby that gets me the most -- his usage of the bullpen. He absolutely abuses his relievers while clinging to his righty-righty and lefty-lefty matchups. Peter Moylan, who was 11 months removed from Tommy John surgery, made 87 appearances, which was good for second in the majors behind Pedro Feliciano's 88 (At the beginning of last season, Cox talked endlessly about protecting Moylan, but instead, he gives him a career high in appearances. WTF?). Mike Gonzalez finished right behind him with 80. Eric O'Flaherty and Rafael Soriano finished off the top 10 with 78 and 77, respectively.  Moylan, Gonzalez, and Soriano each pitched over 70 innings, but I'm more interested in O'Flaherty only pitching 56 innings. 

Fifty-six innings! In 78 appearances! My mom complains about paying money to a guy who only gets one out a game, and while O'Flaherty really gets two people out a game, he still fits in that category. Honestly, I like O'Flaherty. He's effective, and because he's still making the league-minimum, I really don't mind having him as a lefty specialist (he actually did fairly well against righties with a .282/.375/.301 line, and his BABIP against them was .325 -- or their BABIP against him, whichever). I wonder, however, if he doesn't waste more energy in the bullpen than on the mound in the actual game.

And then I thought a little harder about the situation. Does the reliever expend more energy in the bullpen than in the game? Does he expend a similar amount? I imagine they throw something like 30-40 pitches in the bullpen before they're ready to come in, and when they come in, they usually last an inning (about 16 pitches on average) or less (fewer than 16 pitches, obviously). I guess they don't use as much energy to throw each pitch in the bullpen as they do in the game, but you can't exactly just soft-toss it in there.

When the reliever actually makes an "appearance" in a game, I don't really think it matters all that much. By the time you enter the game, your arm is pretty warm, and the extra pitches don't make a substantial difference unless you stink up the joint by allowing a few runs and throwing another 30 pitches (and then you kind of deserve the extra discomfort, right?). But what about when you don't make an "appearance" but still warm up? If the answer to one of those questions above was "yes" (and I think it is to at least the second question), then I think we might want to pay a bit more attention.

Again, the one thing I really can't stand about Bobby is the way in which he uses his bullpen, and his need for orthodoxy is only one part. I don't have the proof (though I hope this sparks some research for the proof), but I would put money down on Bobby being one of the worst transgressors in blue-balling relievers. Because of his need to stick to his R-R and L-L matchups, he has to get multiple pitchers up at once just in case, but the inning does not always require the extra reliever(s) to be used. Then when he gets to the eighth or ninth and could bring in Soriano and Gonzalez to finish off the game, the reliever(s) never made it into the game (It really bothers me when Bobby does this. When you get a reliever warm, you should try to use him, and a lot of times, he could have but decided to bring in someone else anyway. Kills me). 

If it takes as much effort to warm up as it does to actually pitch, then a reliever who warms up but does not pitch still makes an appearance, at least in terms of effort. We measure appearances in order to measure how much a manager abuses a certain reliever (or in Bobby's, and Jerry Manuel's apparently as well, case, multiple relievers), but as I've mentioned, appearances don't measure all of the abuse (or use; "abuse" is maybe a bit harsh). Instead, I advocate that we also count times when the reliever warms up but does not get in the game. If they get in the game, then only count it as one appearance (not one for the warm-up and one for the actual appearance). So as soon as the pitcher gets up to warm up, mark it down as an appearance.

"Does this matter?" you ask. I'm not sure yet, but I also don't know the results of any research. Moylan made 87 appearances last season, but I'd be willing to venture that he made another 20 "appearances" or so, giving him 107 now for the season. I'd also argue that Bobby is worse about this than other managers. Let's use a hypothetical example (I don't know if Mike Scioscia is worse about this or not, but let's assume he is). Brian Fuentes made the most appearances by an Angel last season with 65. If we allow that Scioscia is better about getting warmed up relievers into the game, then we could say that Fuentes made an additional 10 "appearances". He now has 75 for the season. Instead of the initial 22 appearance difference between he and Moylan, it's was actually 32. Is that a significant enough difference? I'll let you decide.

JA Happ and Building Bridges

from Sports Illustrated

 

I was watching the Braves-Phillies game on ESPN Wednesday, and JA Happ took the mound against Tim Hudson. Seeing Happ reminds me of a lot of things wrong in the advancement of sabermetrics. It's not his fault. He really has nothing to do with it, but his performance is a symbol of it.

Phillies fans love him, and why wouldn't they? The 27-year old comes in and goes 12-4 with a 2.89 ERA in 166 innings, and everything baseball fans have ever been told portrays this performance as a masterpiece of sorts. It's hard enough to have an ERA under 4 in the majors, and this guy just had an ERA under 3! If he had done it after just three starts, Philly fans would have known that he probably couldn't continue doing such an impressive job, but after 23 starts, it becomes more difficult to believe that he isn't that good.

Of course, sabermetricians have other ideas. They've come to realize that wins and ERA are context-dependent and don't properly value a pitcher's performance. Wins do somewhat measure a pitcher's performance (he is the one pitching), but they also depend on run support, how long the pitcher pitches, defense, etc. ERA is similar. It does reflect, somewhat, a pitcher's performance, but it's also dependent on defense, where hit balls fall, scorer's decisions, etc. So when sabermetricians see the above statistics, they've been trained to be wary.

Instead, they use things like FIP that are based on K/9, BB/9, and HR, which Voros McCracken determined (through rigorous research) that are the only statistics that pitchers have control over. The idea being that a pitcher's stuff determines how many bats they miss (K/9), his command determines how many batters get on strictly because of him (BB/9), and his stuff and tendencies determine the amount of fair balls struck that a defense can't get to (HR). According to FIP, Happ isn't such a good pitcher. His FIP (which is made to look like ERA) was 4.33, a full run and a half higher than his ERA. This disconnect between the sabermetric and traditionalist perspective causes a little rift between the two groups in a few ways.

1) Sabermetricians generally attribute the gap between ERA and FIP to "luck", and oh, does that cause problems. Here in America, we don't like "luck". We get what we get because we "deserve" it. Of course, the world doesn't really work that way, but when it comes to criticisms of ourselves or of our team's players, don't even go there (I wonder how many Philly fans agreed Kevin Millwood was having a fluky season but disagreed about Happ). The problem is that the difference wasn't necessarily due to luck, per se. Part of it was probably due to Philadelphia having an above-average defense (that was intended), thus making plays on balls in play that other defenses wouldn't have (Thus, with other pitchers on other teams, the runner reaches base and has an additional opportunity to score). Part of it was due to Happ's out of average .270 BABIP. But even that doesn't mean he was "lucky". He might be able to hold hitters down to that level, though it's very unlikely, but we won't know for a few more years. Regardless, "luck" really isn't the right word, though there likely is some luck involved. Instead, let's try "due to difference in team support and chance". "Luck" implies that Fortune smiled on Happ giving him an unfair advantage, but "chance" doesn't have a connotation and implies that it just happened to end up the way it did, which is what most sabermetricians mean anyway (language is a funny thing).

2) What's a small sample size? Most fans realize that a pitcher won't pitch the same every time out. If he throws a complete-game shutout, he likely won't do it again the next time out. Most people even realize that a month's worth of starts don't properly indicate what a pitcher is. But what about a full season? It seems so long that bounces should even out, right? 162 games of 54 (sometimes 51 and sometimes more) outs will likely see everything even out, right? Sorry, but it doesn't. There's been a lot of research done, and there's a lot of fluctuation from year to year. Happ's 166 innings are impressive, but we need a couple more seasons to get a real indication of his performance (really more like an entire career).

3) Even if people understand all this, the popular comparison to Happ is Tom Glavine. Superficially, neither throws particularly hard and both have good change-ups. Statistically, Glavine wasn't all that impressive. He struck out 5.32 per 9 and walked 3.06 per 9 for an uninspiring 1.74 K/BB. But he had a way with home runs (0.73 HR/9). If he could do it, then why can't Happ (6.69 K/9, 3/21 BB/9, 2.08 K/BB) do it as well? The problem is that we don't really know. Glavine, however, was an exception, but unfortunately, we don't know why. He outperformed his FIP (3.95) by a half run (3.54 ERA), and pitchers just don't do that. Around 95% (someone correct me if I'm wrong) of pitchers' FIPs end up +/- 0.2 away from their ERA for their career, but Glavine seemed to have some ability to suppress runs. Finding this ability would help explain the difference (possible) between Happ and Glavine, but not having it leaves a hole in the argument. (To be honest, I've always considered Glavine the worst of the Big Three, and I've often wondered if he really wasn't a Hall of Fame pitcher and just a very good pitcher that benefited from a good team and almost no injuries, which allowed him accumulate counting stats in a manner similar to what Andy Pettitte could do). Happ could be that good, but the odds are against it.

4) Even knowing this, Happ will regress. Glavine, with his "special abilities", couldn't sustain sub-3 ERAs, and neither will Happ. Bill James and CHONE see major regressions to the 4.30 ERA range. A few things, however, can happen. One, Happ regresses to this level, and someone will claim that he got screwed on the luck scale (which may or may not be right). Two, he regresses a bit to the 3.60-3.70 range, and we'll need some further evaluation. Three, Happ repeats, and we're left to wonder whether he's that good or if he just received the positive side of "team support and chance" (even that phrase is somewhat colored; damn). In any matter, we won't really know. Unfortunately, you have to wait a few more years, and really an entire career, but we don't really like to wait that long even though it's the only way to gain historical perspective.

5) Traditionalists take this to mean that sabermetricians don't think Happ is a good pitcher, and that just isn't true. Happ's ERA indicates an ace, but he just isn't that good. He's a solid pitcher, and there's nothing wrong with that. It still makes him better than most major-league pitchers, and he's definitely better than 99.999% of all pitchers in the USA. Unfortunately in the effort to prove that Happ wasn't ace good, sabermetricians might have gone overboard. It's also very possible that Happ fans overreacted to a bit of criticism. It's most likely that a bit of both happened.

6) It's also entirely possible that Happ improves. Hitters improve -- learning the strike zone, what pitches they can hit, etc. --, and pitchers can, too. Happ could strike out a few more batters by a) learning a new effective pitch (he's apparently learned a cutter, which didn't help when Prado raked it for a home run but that's a really small sample size, isn't it?), b) re-ordering his pitches and learning to change speeds better, and/or c) throwing his pitches with increased consistency at a high level. He could also stand to walk a few less hitters (3.04 BB/9 is okay but leaves something to be desired). If he does this, his FIP will come down and his ERA won't elevate so much. This might cause a few problems, though. One, it doesn't mean sabermetricians were wrong about 2009, but Happ fans might not see it that way. Two, it demonstrates the weakness of statistics -- they can't predict new variables like that (yes, ladies and gentleman, intangibles exist, but yes, they will also be measured). Either way, improvement won't look good for sabermetrics, which really isn't fair.

7) The word "regress" is another nasty word. It has a few definitions. One is "to go back; move backward", and another is "to return to a previous, usually worse or less developed, state". Most fans identify these definitions with what sabermetricians mean by "regress". This, then, implies that Happ will somehow lose talent, and fans, rightly, don't see how that would happen. Of course, this isn't what sabermetricians mean. The other definition of regress is "to have a tendency to approach or go back to a statistical mean" This definition has no connotation like the other two do. Statisticians just mean that Happ's statistics will go toward a mean, or average, but regress doesn't necessarily mean that in a bad way. Ricky Nolasco will also "regress" this season, but his statistics will likely go the opposite way. Fans need to realize this. Sabermetricians also need to realize what most fans will think, and when they use the word "regress", they should also mention what they mean by that word. It helps. Happ's talent won't regress, in the sense of the first two definitions. It's just that the results were a little better than his talent implies.

My point in all this isn't to prove whether or not Happ is a great or just good pitcher. Other people who understand these stats better have done that, and I assume that a Google search will lead one to one of those explanations. The point I'm trying to make is that there are certain misunderstandings that occur between traditionalists and sabermetricians. In order to build bridges instead of burning them, we have to be constantly aware of what we say and their underlying meanings and connotations. It takes more work to do this, but to get somewhere in this little dilemma, we have to be willing to put in a little extra effort. 

Platooning Defense

from Atlanta Journal-Constitution

When I say the word "platoon" in reference to baseball, what comes to mind? You probably think of two players that are good enough to be in the majors but not good enough to start every day. They also have the coincidence of hitting on opposite sides of the plate, one on the left and the other on the right. The lefty bashes righties (or at least hits well ... or at least better than the righty does against righties), and the righty bashes lefties (or ... you get the point). They also share the same position. Therefore, the lefty plays when a righty is on the mound, and the righty plays when a lefty is on the mound. Simple, right? And pretty much every team uses it. But I wonder why no one thinks about platoon situations in regard to the guy on the mound for your team.


Let's use an example. You're the Seattle Mariners, and you have two fringe guys playing first in Ryan Garko and Casey Kotchman. Garko is right-handed and hits LHP (.313/.392/.495) much better than RHP (.266/.335/.420). Kotchman is left-handed and hits RHP (.267/.337/.414) a bit better than LHP (.277/.314/.378), but regardless of the lack of a massive split, he isn't good enough with the stick to warrant an everyday job if he has a right-handed caddy, especially one like Garko. Neither is being used effectively if they are playing every day. Using a traditional platoon arrangement, Kotchman would play against RHP, and Garko would start against LHP. But why is only the handedness of the other pitcher taken into consideration when making out a starting lineup? Why not take your pitcher into consideration?

Here's what I mean. Kotchman (around a +8 UZR) is a significantly better first baseman than Garko (around a -6 UZR). So when Felix Hernandez (2.17 career GB/FB) is on the mound, why not have Kotchman start regardless? There will be more groundballs, and thus, Kotchman has a better chance to make an impact with his glove while Garko would be more of a liability. Then, when Cliff Lee (0.89 career GB/FB) pitches, you can feel free to use whichever first baseman has the better matchup against the other team's pitcher because the impact that either first baseman can make has gone down significantly. In the outfield, the situation would be reversed. You would put the better defender out there for Lee (Langerhans -- +17.6 UZR in LF) and not worry with Hernandez (Bradley -- -0.1 UZR in LF, though +6.9 in RF).

The increased defense would then offset the decreased offense in the same way that, in the traditional platoon arrangement, the increased offense offsets the decrease in defense. Right? Of course, I don't really have the math to prove it, but my math skills are limited (though I have a new book to try to rectify that). But my point isn't necessarily to prove that the defensive arrangement is more important than the offensive. It may not be. The offensive player could hit a home run, making a huge impact on the game, while the defensive player may allow one more base. Granted, that's not always going to happen, and that's not the true difference in value. The offensive platoon doesn't always result in another home run every game. It's much smaller than that, and it seems reasonable, to me, that the defensive switch could make as big of a difference.

But again, that's not my point. My point is how we look at the game. Although we've made these great strides in measuring defensive value, we still look at the game from an offensive standpoint. Why would we switch the lineup? Because it helps our offense. Do we think about helping our defense in the same way?

And why do we think that way? In my opinion, it's because we've always valued offense more than defense, and still do. Historical teams couldn't quantify defense, but they could quantify offense. You could see the difference in having a better hitter in the lineup. But it's much harder to see the change in defense. It's like trying to prove a negative. How do you know that guy would have made that play that the other guy couldn't? It's almost impossible to compare. That idea has, then, funneled through the ages, slowly creeping into our subconscious as givens. What's more is that platooning has been proven to be an effective tactic because the research shows the splits. People have begun to crash through the "givens" that are easily visible -- batting average, ERA, etc., and they've done a wonderful job. But we're not done. We have to continue asking questions and questioning assumptions. Things like this still exist in baseball. I'm okay if I'm proven wrong and that offense, in this situation, is more important than defense, but I'd feel horrible if no one went through the trouble to find out.

The TMI Conundrum

from BallHype

 

When ESPN began the TMI Blog, it peaked my interest. Here is the world leader in sports beginning to incorporate advanced statistics and analysis into their baseball coverage. Fantastic! Well, my optimism had already been tempered a bit because of the "Hot Stove U" series where you were supposed to learn 30 things you needed to learn for the upcoming season. As it turned out, you learned 10 things you needed to know, 7 that are nice to know, and 13 things that pushed baseball analysis back 15 years (those numbers are unofficial, by the way). It allayed my fears, however, when I saw that the blog was going to be a combination of Baseball Prospectus, FanGraphs, Sky Andrecheck, and Tom Tango. You can't go wrong there, right? After a few weeks of reading, I've decided that this may not have been the best idea.

1) The name is terrible. "The Max Info"? Really? They paid for that idea? They could have sent me $20, and I could have created a better title. Yes, I get it. TMI is IM code for "too much information", and this is a little play on words (or acronyms). Cute. And "The Max Info" is supposed to strike the reader in a reverse psychology type of thing, and the reader will realize this isn't "too much information" but the "information you need to know". See what I mean? This is way too involved. Come up with a catchy title, and add the information. The problem, anyway, is that most baseball fans will read it,  associate it with "nerd sabermetricians who ruin baseball", and actually think it will be TMI, or extraneous information.

2) It hasn't exactly been just a combination of the people I mentioned above. In fact, it's been more of a showcase for the guys in the ESPN Stats and Info Department, and that's fine. It's ESPN's prerogative, because it is their website, to use their own people. Unfortunately, I worry about the associations people will make.  Essentially, this blog promotes all of these statisticians as equals, and if you've read the blog, you've probably realized that the ESPN guys are still a step or two behind. But most readers will read the ESPN guys, understand them better, and agree with them, ignoring the other guys because they're talking about WAR and VORP. Which leads me to my third (and really most important) point.

3) Sabermetricians are bad promoters by trade (apparently). They are really smart people who have done absolutely marvelous work, but it appears that most of them have no idea how to market their ideas. It's unfortunate that you would have to "market" information, but everyone knows this is a marketplace. Go back and read the FanGraphs and Baseball Prospectus stuff. Now imagine that you're a regular baseball fan who likes to watch baseball but doesn't pay attention to much more than the Sunday Night game. Or imagine that you're a 19 year old who is first hearing about this new analysis. Go back and read those same posts again. Would you understand it? There are no explanations of wOBA and WAR or how anyone came up with them. Why would anyone listen? ESPN, on the other hand, does a much better job. They're explanations, though (as stated previously) flawed, are more apt to gaining a wider audience, and if they're sticking with the ESPN writers, there's a problem.

Here's what you do -- EXPLAIN. And explain often. I realize it's a bit tiresome to keep reiterating over and over again the definitions and explanations of each of these statistics, some of which have been around for a decade or more. In my opinion, writers need to do it anyway and even on their own sites, but they need to do it especially ON SITES WHERE THE READERS HAVE NO IDEA WHAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT. I can understand if you don't do it on your own sites. That's fine. People come to your site because they generally already know what you're talking about. I think it would still be helpful if you explained every once in a while anyway, but I get it. When, however, you write for a site with a different clientele while trying to promote yourself to a clientele that needs to be won over, you should probably go above and beyond trying to get your point across. The burden of proof is on you. The effort needs to be made by you (yes, they should make some effort, too). You are speaking Latin, and they're speaking in the vernacular. RBI is vernacular. All baseball fans understand it and what it means. wOBA is a foreign language. Don't dumb it down. Just make it so that even beginners will understand. In order for them to learn, you must teach. Eventually, you won't have to explain so much, but we're not there yet.

But here's the conundrum (remember, it was in the title). Though I don't think the blog has really done very much for the promotion of sabermetrics (I can't really say for sure because I don't have access to financial records, but with some tweaks, they might actually make more money), it still has promotional value. I saw a statistic somewhere that 99.4% of the people watching the World Series last year had never heard of Baseball Prospectus, and the TMI blog, and the Hot Stove U series, has undoubtedly decreased that number. And that's a great thing. The more people that know about these sites and these statistics, the better. I just think the blog and the people contributing to the blog could do a better job because it's a fantastic opportunity for everyone -- ESPN, the writers, sabermetricians, and the general audience.

Contract Talks and Addressing the Elephant in the Room

from Sports Illustrated

 

A national crisis has been averted, and Joe Mauer signed a contract extension to remain with the Twins for the next nine seasons, including this one. To be honest, I'm not incredibly impressed with the deal from the Twins standpoint (obviously, it's pretty awesome from Mauer's), but they had zero leverage. But I'm not here to talk about WAR and the market price for wins. I want to know what happened in the negotiating room, particularly when it came to the elephant.

Currently, Mauer is 26 years old, and in a month, he'll turn 27. He's in his prime physically. He's already one of the best hitters in the game, and he won his second straight Gold Glove last season (yes, we can argue over the validity of such an award, but he is widely considered a great defensive catcher; maybe I should have just said that instead). But in four years, he will be 30 going on 31, and there will be five seasons left on his contract. He's already played 607 games behind the plate, and if he stays reasonably healthy for the next four seasons, he will have played 520 more (130 games on average). I realize that 30 and 31 year olds should be better able to handle the workload, and Mauer seems to take good care of himself. But I wonder what the true age of those knees are? Don't forget that he was sidelined for most of 2004 because of a knee injury, and he seems to have some back issues. And at age 30-31, the Twins will have approximately $117.5 MM left on Mauer's contract.


Obviously, I'm harping on the potential injury risk, but I'm willing to grant that Jorge Posada is still catching at age 38 (though he hasn't been a catcher his entire life). Still, Bench was done as a catcher by 33, and Piazza was as well (though he caught 101 games at 35). Regardless, Mauer could catch through the life of his contract, but I wonder if he should. More importantly, I'm wondering if a position switch was addressed at all during the negotiations.

How does a team handle such a subject? From their perspective, it might minimize the risk by moving him to third or first, but in the middle of a negotiation in which you have no leverage, do you chance bringing it up? To a competitive athlete in his prime, this might come off as an insult, and it might hurt the negotiations. On one hand, this is a completely rational approach by the Twins to ask about such a move, but on the other hand, people don't react rationally. After eight or nine years in the organization, the Twins probably know his personality and how he might react.

And how would you react as a player? Mauer is fully healthy. His knee problems don't seem to have flared up since 2004, and his back didn't seem to mind carrying the Twins to the division title last season. He keeps himself in great shape, and there's reason to believe he can catch throughout the life of his contract. AND, the Twins want to pay you $184 MM! They think that much of you (and other teams might think more of you), but they want you to switch positions in the middle of the contract? Plus, when have you ever played third or first on a consistent basis? Will you be comfortable there? More importantly, are you guaranteed not to get hurt there? And does a player consider his future (after baseball)? Mauer's knees are going to be horrible if he plays the rest of his career behind the plate, and at age 50, he might regret that. But do you think that far ahead? Sometimes, it's hard to admit that, at some point, you won't be able to do what you can now?

And what about Wilson Ramos, the hot catching prospect? He's almost 23, and he'll be in AAA this season. Do you trade him now to address another need? Do you stash him on the bench for three years? Do you use him to show Mauer that it might be better to move off catcher and let him play? Granted, Ramos isn't a sure thing, but you have to keep him in mind.

And what about the guys Mauer would be replacing? Danny Valencia wouldn't be that big of a roadblock, and they could just trade him. Most people, however, have mentioned first base. What do you do about Morneau? I'm guessing Minnesotans love them some Morneau. He'll be at first at least through 2013, and he'll be 32. There would be no reason not to re-sign him or move him (unless he gets hurt, but we're looking on the bright side).

Or do you just roll with the punches? Just let things come as they may? Do you not plan, knowing things can drastically change? Or is your (Bill Smith's) job on the line to the point where not planning could kill you?

I'm not sure what I'd do. But I have two comments. One, I hope the Twins and Mauer talked about this because it could have a major impact on the organization. Two, I'm glad I'm not Bill Smith.

Note: This is a bit different than the Derek Jeter situation. Jeter is well past his prime, and while it might be sticky, you have to ask him about moving.